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SURVEY SECTION
Family Law. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1999). The pro-
bate court lacks jurisdiction to decide a petition for guardianship of
a child where a parent opposes the petition. The party seeking
guardianship must first file a petition for termination of parental
rights with the family court, as only the family court may termi-
nate parental rights or divest a parent of custody.
In Carr v. Prader,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether the probate court has jurisdiction to
appoint a temporary or permanent guardian for a minor child
where the parent of the child retains his parental rights and op-
poses the petition for guardianship. The court determined that a
municipal probate court does not have the authority to terminate
parental rights.2 A person seeking guardianship of the person and
the estate must first file a petition in the family court for the termi-
nation of parental rights. 3 Upon the granting of that petition by
the family court, the person may either petition the family court
for adoption of the child, petition the family court for the perma-
nent guardianship of the child, or petition the probate court for the
permanent guardianship of the child and the estate.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Heidi and Timothy Carr married on September 23, 1989.5 The
Carrs resided in the Spotsylvania, Virginia area, and their wedlock
produced two children, Jonathan and Jamie.6 After nearly six
years of tumultuous marriage, Heidi Carr (Heidi) took the two boys
and moved to Newport, Rhode Island in March of 1995.7 Following
the move, Heidi obtained sole custody of both children, first
through an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Spotsylvania County, Virginia and thereafter from a July 17, 1996,
restraining order issued by the Rhode Island Family Court.8
1. 725 A.2d 291 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 295.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 292.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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Heidi was diagnosed with terminal cancer in the summer of
1996. 9 Just before her last hospitalization, Heidi left Jamie with
her cousin, Valerie Prader (Valerie), who resided in Newport, and
left Jonathan with another cousin, Gina Prader, who resided in
Massachusetts.10 On January 18, 1997, Heidi died." Following
Heidi's death, Valerie's emergency petition for temporary custody
of Jamie was granted by the family court ex parte. 12 Valerie peti-
tioned the probate court in Newport for guardianship of Jamie. 13
At this point, Timothy Carr (Carr) moved to dismiss the petition
based upon insufficient jurisdiction.' 4 Carr argued that "the pro-
bate court lacked the authority to award permanent guardianship
of a minor child over the opposition of a surviving parent," and fur-
thermore, the "Family Court was the more appropriate forum for
the dispute."15
Upon the probate court's denial of his motion to dismiss, Carr
appealed to the superior court.' 6 Awaiting a decision on the juris-
dictional issue, the probate court entered a consent order, staying
further proceedings and allowing Valerie to retain temporary cus-
tody of Jamie. 17 After a hearing on the jurisdictional issue, the
superior court certified the following questions of law to be decided
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court:
1. Does the probate court have jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian of the person and estate of a six year old minor
child who is not orphaned and who has a surviving natural
parent whose parental rights have never been terminated
but whose fitness to serve as the minor's guardian has
been raised in the probate proceedings?
2. Does the probate court have jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian, either temporary or permanent, of the person
and estate of a six year old minor in a contest between the
cousin of the deceased mother and the surviving natural
father under the following facts:
9. See id.
10. See id. Jonathan resides with Heidi's mother, and "his custody is not part
of this litigation." Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 293.
17. See id.
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a. at the time of her death, the natural mother was sepa-
rated from, but legally married to the natural father;
b. prior to her death, the natural mother had been
awarded sole custody of the minor [by] family court or-
ders in Virginia and Rhode Island, and at the time of
her death, she had sole custody of the minor;
c. the surviving natural father's parental rights have
never been terminated but his fitness to serve as guard-
ian of the child has been raised by the petitioner in the
probate proceedings;
d. after the death of the natural mother, the Rhode Island
Family Court awarded temporary sole custody of the
minor child to said cousin of the deceased mother, but
has held further hearing in abeyance pending disposi-
tion of the subject probate court petition filed by the
cousin for guardianship of the minor?' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Accepting that upon Heidi's death, Carr automatically re-
ceived custody of Jamie, the Rhode Island Supreme Court framed
the central issue in this case as "whether probate courts have the
power to terminate a parent's natural guardianship and concomi-
tant custody rights." 19 The court pointed out that both probate
courts and the family courts possess limited jurisdiction as con-
ferred by statute.20 Although probate courts are permitted to ap-
point guardians,21 they do not have the statutory authority to
terminate parental rights and award custody.22 Moreover, the
statutory authority granted to the family court is limited, and pa-
rental rights may only be terminated upon a showing of "inter alia,
willful neglect, abandonment, desertion, or parental unfitness
demonstrated by 'cruel or abusive nature' or chronic substance
abuse." 23
Recognizing that the laws of the State of Rhode Island favor
maintaining the integrity of the family unit,24 the Rhode Island
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15.1-4 (1956) (1995 Reenactment).
22. See Carr, 725 A.2d at 294.
23. See id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (1956) (1996 Reenactment)).
24. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 40-11-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
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Supreme Court addressed the family court's options upon a finding
of neglect or abuse.25 For example, the family court may allow the
Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) to supervise
the placement of the child in the home, or may grant custody to
DCYF until the child may be safely reunited with the parents. 26 In
particular, the family court may only grant a petition for guardian-
ship that is opposed by a parent once those parental rights are ter-
minated.27 This requires a finding of parental unfitness based
upon "clear and convincing evidence." 28 In sum, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court determined that under the facts presented "a par-
ent only can lose guardianship or custody.., if that parent has
acted in a way deleterious to his or her child's well-being," and
moreover, "[olnly the Family Court has the statutory power to
make such findings of parental unfitness." 29
Looking at municipal probate courts, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court acknowledged that such courts are well-suited for
administering estates, but lack the "experience and resources of
the family court to determine questions of parental fitness."30 Con-
trary to Valerie's contention, the court resolved that probate courts
are without the legal authority to terminate parental rights or de-
prive parents of custody. 31 According to the court, a broader read-
ing of the probate court's authority would be "inappropriate given
the detailed statutory regulation of family court decision-making
on identical issues."32 The court noted this construction would de-
feat the legislature's preference for keeping families intact, and
raise due process issues by avoiding the requirement in the family
court that a parent be deemed unfit before his parental rights
25. See id.
26. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-12(b) (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 295.
31. See id. Valerie argued that such power is implied in R. I. Gen. Laws § 33-
15.1-1, reads in part:
the father and mother shall be joint natural guardians of their minor chil-
dren .... Provided, however, this section ... shall not affect the right of
the probate court duly to appoint a legal guardian . . .of the person or
estate of any minor children ... in which event the appointment of the
probate court... shall supersede the natural guardianship insofar as the
same shall be inconsistent with the appointment ....
Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15.1-1).
32. Id.
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could be terminated. 33 Therefore, probate courts may only appoint
permanent guardians after the family court has found the natural
parents unfit.34
Having determined that a municipal probate court does not
have the authority to terminate parental rights or divest a parent
of custody, the Rhode Island Supreme Court proceeded to discuss
how a person may obtain guardianship of a minor child where a
surviving parent opposes the guardianship petition.35 The court
concluded that although the probate court does not have jurisdic-
tion to appoint a permanent guardian, it may appoint a temporary
guardian.36 The temporary guardian may file a petition in the
family court for custody of the child, or for the termination of pa-
rental rights on the ground of unfitness. 37
Once the petition for termination of parental rights has been
filed, the family court may terminate the parental rights, or pursu-
ant section 14-1-32 of the Rhode Island General Laws, may find
the child is dependent and neglected and award custody to the
temporary guardian. 38 During the pendency of this petition, the
family court should make reasonable efforts to unify the parent
and child. 39 If the parental rights are terminated, the temporary
guardian may petition the family court for adoption of the child.40
Alternatively, the temporary guardian may file a petition in the
family court to be named permanent guardian of the child pursu-
ant section 40-11-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws, or may pe-
tition the probate court for appointment as a permanent guardian
of the person and estate of the minor child pursuant to sections 33-
15.1-4 and 33-15.1-5 of the Rhode Island General Laws.41
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court declared that the family
court is the appropriate forum for guardianship petitions which
are opposed by a parent. Consequently, municipal probate courts
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 296.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 295-96.
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must defer such decisions to the family court, "which alone has the
express statutory power to divest a parent of custody and/or paren-
tal rights along with the expertise and resources essential to exer-
cise such power."42
John B. Garry
42. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
Family Law. Desper v. Talbot, 727 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1999). In a
civil action seeking to reach and apply a decedent's equity in mari-
tal property to satisfy a judgment, the superior court has jurisdic-
tion over the action under section 9-28-1 of the Rhode Island
General Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1971, plaintiff Evelyn Desper (Evelyn) and decedent Donald
Desper (Donald) were divorced.I Prior to their divorce, they owned
and lived in a home in Franklin, Massachusetts, as tenants by en-
tireties.2 After the divorce, Evelyn continued to live at the Frank-
lin residence with the couple's five children. 3 By divorce decree,
Donald was ordered to pay thirty dollars per week for child sup-
port.4 However, Donald failed to make the child support payments
for a nineteen year period beginning in 1971 until his death on
October, 5, 1990. 5 Donald had been living in Woonsocket for a
number of years with his live-in girlfriend and therefore, upon his
death, his last will and testament was admitted to probate in the
Woonsocket Probate Court.6 Donald intentionally excluded each
his five children and devised his undivided one-half interest in the
Franklin estate to his live-in girlfriend.7
Evelyn filed a claim in probate court for $41,562.79, the
amount of unpaid child support due under the divorce decree.8
Evelyn requested that Leah Talbot, the executrix of Donald's es-
tate, transfer to her all of Donald's one-half interest in the Frank-
lin property, which had a value of $35,500.9 Talbot denied
1. See Desper v. Talbot, 727 A.2d 1233, 1233 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. The 1971 divorce rendered the estate by entirety to be terminated
and for Evelyn and Donald then to each own one half of the Franklin estate as
tenants in common. See id. at 1234 n.1 (citing Blitzer v. Blitzer, 361 Mass. 918,
920 (1972)).
3. See id. at 1233.
4. See id. at 1233-34.
5. See id. at 1234.
6. See id. Although Donald died October 5, 1990, his last will and testament
was only presented for probate in 1992 and the executrix was appointed on Novem-
ber 12, 1992. See id. at 1235.
7. See id. at 1234.
8. See id.
9. See id. Evelyn asserted that the entire property had an appraised value of
$71,000.00. See id.
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Evelyn's request and claims.' 0 Evelyn then filed a civil action in
the Providence County Superior Court against Talbot, seeking the
$41,562.79 in unpaid child support, as well as one-half of the mort-
gage, insurance and tax payments Evelyn had made to maintain
the Franklin property."
Summary judgment was entered for Evelyn on July 25, 1997,
for $101,488.57.12 The judgment was executed on September 2,
1997, and was returned wholly unsatisfied. 13 In order to satisfy
her July 25, 1997 judgment, Evelyn filed a post judgment motion
on September 5, 1997, seeking to have Donald's one-half interest in
the Franklin property transferred to her and alternatively, a mo-
tion to reach and apply the Franklin property pursuant to section
9-28-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws.' 4 Evelyn also sought an
order to require the executrix's attorney to vacate and remove his
notice of attorney's lien against the property.'1 In addition, Evelyn
filed a separate petition in superior court to satisfy her judgment,
seeking to reach and apply the Franklin property. 16
Evelyn's two actions were consolidated and were heard before
the superior court on December 18, 1997.17 The superior court re-
manded the matter to the Woonsocket Probate Court on the basis
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action.' 8
Evelyn appealed this ruling.' 9
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-28-1 provides:
Any judgment creditor, after his or her execution has been returned
wholly or in part unsatisfied, may, by a civil action in the nature of a
creditor's bill, reach and apply and subject to the payment and satisfac-
tion of his or her judgment any equitable estate, any equitable assets, or
any choses in action of the judgment debtor.... The remedy provided by
this section shall be cumulative and shall not supersede any existing
remedy.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-28-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
15. See Desper, 727 A.2d at 1234. The executrix obtained an attorney to con-
test Evelyn's claims once an action was filed in superior court. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the superior
court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over a judgment creditor's equitable action brought pursuant to
section 9-28-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws.20 Evelyn is not
precluded from filing a creditor's equitable action as a remedy
under the reach and apply provision of the statute because it
clearly provides for "any judgment creditor" to reach any equitable
estate or assets to satisfy her judgment.21 The court found that
Donald maintained an equitable interest in the Franklin property
because according to Massachusetts law, Donald's interest as a
tenant in common qualifies as a one-half interest in the equity of
the property. 22 In addition, the court concluded that the complex
procedural posture of the instant case required them to "fashion
what we believe will be a fair and finite resolution of the procedur-
ally entangled litigation that has generated from Donald's insol-
vent probate estate proceedings." 23
The supreme court ruled that Evelyn's claim for unpaid child
support should not have been denied by the executrix because Don-
ald's death did not relieve him of his obligations. 24 The court rec-
ognized that Donald's estate was insolvent, but remanded the case
to the superior court in order to: grant Evelyn's reach and apply
petition; order the executrix to convey all of Donald's equity inter-
est in the Franklin property to Evelyn to satisfy her July 25, 1997
judgment against Donald's estate; order Evelyn to pay Donald's fu-
neral expenses, the executrix's attorney's fees and the executrix's
fees; order the attorney's lien against the property to be lifted upon
his payment; and, order Donald's estate to be closed by having the
executrix file all necessary documents. 25
20. See id.
21. Id. at 1234-35.
22. See id. at 1235.
23. Id.
24. See id. (citing Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d 79, 83 (R.I. 1978) (holding
that final judgments include unpaid child support allowances); Centazzo v.
Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 562 (R.I. 1989) (holding that death does not relieve one of
his pre-death obligations)).
25. See id. at 1235-36.
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CONCLUSION
In Desper v. Talbot, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the superior court has jurisdiction over a civil action in the form of
a creditor's bill seeking to reach and apply a decedent's marital
property in satisfaction of a judgment pursuant to section 9-28-1 of
the Rhode Island General Laws. The remedy under the statute is
cumulative and does not supersede any existing remedies.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
SURVEY SECTION
Family Law. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 738 A.2d 1081 (R.I. 1999).
At a hearing on a motion to modify a child-custody award, the
court need not give greater weight to the report and recommenda-
tions of a guardian ad litem than to other evidence presented.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Maureen E. D'Onofrio, and the defendant, David
P. D'Onofrio, divorced in 1996.1 In January of that year the family
court, pending entry of final judgement on the divorce, awarded
custody of the parties' minor child to the plaintiff and defendant
jointly, with physical placement with the mother.2 At the time of
the initial custody arrangement both parties lived in Rhode Is-
land.3 However, before the final divorce judgement was entered,
the plaintiff moved to England to reside with the man that would
later become her husband.4 Because of the plaintiff's relocation,
she and the defendant agreed to amend the interlocutory decree to
maintain joint custody but place the child with the father, subject
to extended visits with the mother.5
In October of 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion to change the
custody arrangement so that the child would be placed with her,
and petitioned that she be allowed to relocate with the child to
England. 6 Her petition alleged that the child's maternal grand-
mother was in fact the child's primary caretaker, despite indica-
tions that the mother knew this at the time she agreed to
placement of the child with the father.7 In November of 1996
before a hearing on the plaintiffs motion, the family court ap-
pointed a guardian ad litem for the child.8 The guardian inter-
viewed the child's parents, grandparents, and teachers, as well as
the child herself.9 In April of 1997 the guardian traveled to Eng-
land with the child to visit the mother.10
1. D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 738 A.2d 1081, 1082 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1083.
10. See id.
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At the hearing on the mother's motion, the family court heard
from numerous witnesses." The guardian testified that the child
spent a significant amount of time with her maternal grandmother
because of the father's work schedule and that the child had ex-
pressed a desire to remain in one place. 12 The guardian also testi-
fied that both the father and the maternal grandmother had
demonstrated hostility toward the plaintiffs remarriage, and that
the mother had concerns about the father's ability to foster a rela-
tionship between her and the child due to that hostility.13 The
guardian further testified that after visiting England, the child
told the guardian that she definitely wanted to stay with her
mother. 14 The trial justice found that the mother had chosen to
"put her romantic interest ahead of her child's interest,"' 5 and that
the father provided a stable life for the child.16 Noting that the
mother had the burden of proof, the trial justice did not find that
there had been a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a
change in physical possession.' 7 An order denying plaintiffs mo-
tion was entered in September of 1997, and the mother appealed.' 8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff asserted on appeal that the trial justice disre-
garded the recommendation of the guardian ad litem that residing
with the mother in England was in the child's best interest.' 9 The
plaintiff suggested that the trial justice's failure to give the guard-
ian's testimony more weight was an abuse of discretion.20 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the standard
of review of a child-custody award is abuse of discretion,21 and that
a trial justice should not modify a custody decision unless that
moving party has shown changed circumstances. 22 Furthermore,
the court explained that the burden of proof on the moving party at
11. See id. at 1082.
12. See id. at 1083.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1082.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1083.
21. See id. (citing Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 914 (R.I. 1990)).
22. See id. (citing Suddes v. Spinelli, 703 A.2d 605, 607 (R.I. 1997)).
SURVEY SECTION
the trial level is by a preponderance of the evidence. 23 The court
went on to state that it should not disturb findings of fact made by
the trial justice unless they were "clearly wrong" or the trial justice
"overlooked or misconceived evidence relevant to the issues
decided."2 4
The court explained that in Rhode Island, the appointment of
a guardian ad litem is discretionary rather than mandatory in
child-custody disputes.25 In this case, the guardian was appointed
to investigate the parties' living arrangements, and although the
guardian's report included recommendations, the trial justice was
not required to follow them.26 The court also noted that the trial
justice had sustained the defendant's objections to the plaintiffs
attempts to elicit the guardian's recommendations at the hear-
ing.27 The court stated that Rhode Island, like other jurisdictions,
does not require that a guardian's recommendations or report
carry any greater weight than other evidence presented.28 The
court claimed that this conclusion does not minimize the signifi-
cance of the guardian's role,29 and pointed out that where the
guardian possesses special expertise in child psychology or child-
care, greater evidentiary weight might be lent to his or her testi-
mony.30 However, such a result was not required as a matter of
law.31
The supreme court declined to conclude that the trial justice
had overlooked the evidence in the guardian's report, despite the
fact that the trial justice's decision did not specifically refer to the
report.32 Moreover, the supreme court explained that because the
trial justice did not find changed circumstances, and the guardian's
report did not address that issue, the trial justice had no cause to
refer to the report when rendering his decision. 33 Because the trial
justice was not required to give more weight to the guardian's rec-
ommendations, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dis-
23. See id. (citing Parillo v. Parrillo, 495 A.2d 683, 686 (R.I. 1985)).
24. Id. (citing Lembo v. Lembo, 677 A.2d 414, 417 (R.I. 1996)).
25. See id. (citing Parillo, 495 A.2d at 686).
26. See id. at 1083-84.
27. See id. at 1084.
28. See id.
29. See id. (citing Richelson v. Richelson, 536 A.2d 176, 180 (N.H. 1987)).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
20001
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missed the plaintiffs appeal and affirmed the order of the family
court.
3 4
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that Rhode Island
law does not require that a trial justice give greater weight to the
recommendations or report of a guardian ad litem than to other
evidence presented at a hearing to modify a child custody arrange-
ment. The decision at such a hearing is based on whether there
are changed circumstances from those that existed when the court
made its previous custody decision, and not on the recommenda-
tion of the guardian ad litem.
Jennifer K. Towle
34. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
Family Law. Lembo v. Lembo, 729 A.2d 209 (R.I. 1999). Auto-
matic stay provision of family court does not allow alleged contem-
nor to avoid appearance at' show cause hearing. Procedural due
process safeguards attach to contempt proceedings where alleged
contemnor is absent. Only the alleged contemnor may exercise
waiver of the safeguards.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Donald and Carolyn Lembo were divorced after thirteen years
of marriage in August of 1994.1 The family court entered the final
judgment of divorce and issued a number of accompanying orders. 2
Thereafter, Donald Lembo (Donald) made a habit of appealing any
order issued by a family court justice.3 In order to avoid compli-
ance with any pending orders, he invoked Rule 62(d) of the Family
Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations, the automatic
stay provision. 4 A frustrated trial justice held that Donald was
abusing the appellate process and sanctioned him by ordering him
to pay almost $40,000.5
In addition to the monetary sanction, the justice also ordered
Donald to comply with all future orders, minus those subject to an
appeal, within 45 days. 6 Donald was also required to appear at a
show cause hearing on why he should not be incarcerated. 7 Donald
appealed.8
Donald failed to appear at the show cause hearing.9 The pre-
siding justice declared Donald to be in contempt and continued the
hearing to the following day so that Donald could be heard on why
he failed to appear.' 0 Again, Donald failed to appear at the hear-
ing."1 Instead, his counsel appeared and argued on Donald's be-
half that he should not be required to appear because of the
1. See Lembo v. Lembo, 677 A.2d 414, 416 (R.I. 1996).
2. See Lembo v. Lembo, 729 A.2d 209, 210 (R.I. 1999).
3. See id.
4. See id.; R.I. Fam. Ct. R. P. 62(d).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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automatic stay.12 The trial justice disagreed and held Donald in
contempt. 13 As punishment, he imposed a six-month sentence of
imprisonment. 14 Donald appealed both the contempt finding and
the sentence.' 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court first resolved the frustration of the family
court by addressing Donald's use of the automatic stay provision to
avoid appearance on the contempt issue. 16 The court held that an
appeal from a substantive order does not act to stay a hearing.' 7
Nevertheless, the per curiam opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found the family court's contempt finding infirm.' s
The court then examined whether Donald's alleged contemp-
tuous conduct was properly addressed by the family court.19 In or-
der to do so, they drew on the principles announced in Peltier v.
Peltier.20 In Peltier, an attorney failed to appear on time for a
scheduled hearing.21 In his absence, the trial justice adjudged him
in contempt, and he was subsequently punished. 22 On review, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court enunciated some basic principles ap-
plicable to contempt findings. 23 First, the Peltier court found that
because the attorney was not present at the time of his contempt
(i.e., his absence was the contempt), it was not direct contempt. 24
Direct contempt could only be committed in the "immediate view
and presence of the court .... -25 Second, because the attorney's
conduct amounted to indirect contempt done outside of the court's
presence, the attorney was entitled to a hearing prior to punish-
ment.26 The reasoning behind the distinction is that, in cases of
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 388 A.2d 22, 23 (R.1, 1978).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 23-24.
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direct contempt, the court has personal knowledge and no other
evidence is necessary. 27 Absent this personal knowledge, due pro-
cess requires a hearing.28
The court in Lembo explained that these principles apply to an
indirect contempt finding in the family court.29 Therefore, Donald
was entitled to "be advised of the charges against him, have a rea-
sonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explana-
tion, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a
chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by
way of defense or explanation" before he could be adjudged in con-
tempt.30 Further, the court found that these safeguards may only
be waived by the appearance of the person allegedly in contempt
and not by his attorney.31 Therefore, the appearance of Donald's
attorney did not act as a due process waiver.32 The court re-
manded the case to the family court to afford Donald his due pro-
cess rights.33
CONCLUSION
This case is an important statement of constitutional guaran-
tees that must be afforded by the family court. Before a criminal
contempt finding of the family court may stand, the person alleg-
edly in comptempt must be afforded due process. Due process re-
quires an evidentiary hearing before a contemnor can be found
guilty when the charge is made in contemnor's absence.
Carly E. Beauvais
27. See id. at 24.
28. See id.
29. See Lembo, 729 A.2d at 211.
30. Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948)).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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